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I. THE RELEVANT MARKET PARADOX
Considerable controversy has centered on the elements of a claim
of monopolization or an attempt to monopolize based on patent fraud
under section 2 of the Sherman Act.!
In Oetiker v. Jurid Werke, G.m.b.H.,2 the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, in contrast with several other circuits 3 treated as
open the question whether proof that the patent covers- a substantial
percentage of a "relevant marketfA is a necessary element of a patent
fraud claim.5 In this paper I argue that a "relevant market" analysis
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School
1. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
2. 556 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
3. See, e.g., Forbro Design Corp. v. Raytheon Co., 532 F.2d 758 (1st Cir. 1976); Acme Pre-
cision Prods., Inc. v. American Alloys Corp., 484 F.2d 1237 (8th Cir. 1973); Agrashell, Inc. v.
Hammons Prods. Co., 479 F.2d 269 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1022 (1973); Beckman
Instruments, Inc. v. Chemtronics, Inc., 428 F.2d 555, 567 (5th Cir. 1970); Ekco Prods., Inc. v.
Dare Plastics, Inc., 173 U.S.P.Q. 664 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
4. Oetiker v. Jurid Werke, G.m.b.H., 556 F.2d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In its opinion the
court quoted from Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. and Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172,
177-78 (1965) as follows:
To establish monopolization or attempt to monopolize a part of trade or commerce under
§ 2 of the Sherman Act, it would then be necessary to appraise the exclusionary power of
the illegal patent claim in terms of the relevant market for the product involved.
Without a definition of that market there is no way to measure [the patentee's] abil-
ity to lessen or destroy competition. It may be that the device-knee-action swing dif-
fusers-used in sewage treatment systems does not comprise a relevant market. There
may be effective substitutes for the device which do not infringe the patent. This is a
matter of proof, as is the amount of damages suffered by [the complainant].
Nevertheless, the court reasoned that the Supreme Court's opinion in Walker Process left
open the issue of whether after a full record had been developed, the Court would hold that the
relevant market in a patent fraud case was always coextensive with the claims of the fraudulently
obtained patent.
There is some dispute in the circuits concerning the need for a relevant market anal)sis in
attempt cases. Compare Oetiker with cases cited in note 3 supra. It should be noted, however,
that Professor Turner, whose leading article twenty-one years ago argued against the need for
relevant market analysis in attempt cases, Turner, Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane Case,
70 HARv. L. REy. 281, 305 (1956), has now changed his mind. See Turner, The Scope of
"Attempt to Monopolize", 30 THE REcoRD 487 (1975).
The current status of the law on attempting to monopolize is thoroughly reviewed in Cooper,
Attempts and Monopolization: A Mildly Expansionary Answer to the Prophylactic Riddle of
Section Two, 72 MICH. L. REV. 373 (1974) and Hawk, Attempts to Monopolize-Specific Intent
as Antitrust's Ghost in the Machine, 58 CoRNELL L. REv. 1121 (1973).
5. The question of what conduct before the Patent Office gives rise to a finding of fraud
sufficient to support a § 2 claim has been extensively treated in the literature. See generally, C.
HAMBURG, PATENT FRAUD AND INEQUITABLE CONDUCT (1974); Kayton, Lynch and Stern, Fraud
in Patent Procurement: Genuine and Sham Charges, 43 GBo. WASH. L. REv. 1 (1974), My
views on this subject are found in Adelman and Brooks, The Integrity of the Administrative Pro-
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should not be an element because of a basic incompatibility between
the usual test of monopoly power and a section 2 offense based on pat-
ent fraud.6
Section 2 of the Sherman Act relates to monopolization and at-
tempts and conspiracies to monopolize.7 This; provision is the most
controversial and opaque of all the antitrust laws, a result of inherent
difficulties in identifying and explaining the origin, once found, of mo-
nopoly power. Fortunately, these difficulties may be readily avoided
when section 2 is properly applied to cases of patent fraud.
The economic argument against monopoly is based on the ten-
dency of a monopoly to create higher prices and lower output than
would occur under competition! However, identifying monopoly pri-
cing is often difficult. 9 To understand why this is so, imagine observing
the commercial world with the aim of identifying firms engaged in mo-
nopoly pricing without being aware of any relevant commercial history.
Focus must be placed on factors that economic science has identified as
suggestive of monopoly pricing. One such factor is price discrimina-
tion. Yet even setting aside the difficulties that may exist in its identifi-
cation, price discrimination may only be the result of prices moving
cess, Sherman Sectioj 2 and Per Se Rules-Lessons of Fraud on the Patent Office, 19 WAYNt, L,
REV. 1 (1972).
6. I have previously argued that the definition of monopoly power employed in § 2 cases, i.e.,
the power to raise prices or exclude competitors, automatically eliminated any need for any "rele-
vant market" analysis in patent fraud cases. Adelman and Brooks, supra note 5, at 9-I1. There
the arguments made were essentially legal. This paper reaches the same conclusion based on an
economic analysis of the notion of a "relevant market."
7. 15 U.S.C. § 2 provides:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or con-
spire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misde-
meanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding fifty thou-
sand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments,
in the discretion of the court.
8. A vigorous challenge to this economic case against monopoly and cartelizatlon has
been prompted by the recent discovery in the legal literature by Professors Markovits and Sullivan
of the 20 year old economic doctrine of "second best." See M, rkovits, A Response to Profes-
sor Posner, 28 STAN. L. REV. 919 (1976); Sullivan, Book Review, 75 CoLthM. L. RLv. 1214
(1975).
Professor Posner explains that in its simplest form the theory of second best "is that if the
substitutes for a monopolized product are not being sold at prices equal to their costs, the elimina-
tion of the monopoly may encourage rather than discourage inefficient substitution," R. POSNIIt,
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 13-14 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Pos Nutt,
ANTITRUST LAW]. The change in relative costs due to the elimination of monopoly pricing
of goods produced by only one firm in a market may lead to sutstitution of goods that are pro-
duced at higher social costs than the former monopoly priced goods,
The arguments based on the "second best" challenge to the conventional case against mo-
nopoly are effectively met by Professor Posner. Id. at 8-22, 237-55; Posner, The Social Costs (Pf
Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 807 (1975).
9. Professor Posner discusses the problems of identifying monopoly pricing brought about
by joint action in POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 8, at 39-77. Identifying individual
rather than joint monopoly pricing on economic grounds is even more difficult because of the
lack of evidence based on joint parallel conduct. See also F. SCHIERER, INDUsTRIAL MAIKLT
STRUCTURE AND EcONOMIC PERFORMANCE 50-52 (1970).
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toward a new equilibrium. 10 Another economic indicium of monopoly
pricing occurs when a firm prices on the elastic portion of its demand
curve and there is a substantial differential between the selling price
and cost." Unfortunately, it is usually very difficult to learn the shape
of the demand curve facing the firm. Even if this obstacle could be
overcome, the resulting profits may be merely the result of the riskiness
of the needed investment. Another economic indicator is a "natural
monopoly," occuring when average costs decline substantially with vol-
ume over the relevant portion of the industry's demand curve.12  Aside
from the natural monopoly situation, economic science finds it difficult if
not impossible to determine, without access to a firm's history, whether
it is engaging in monopoly pricing.
History, however, can at times substitute for or supplement a
search for monopoly pricing centered on an economic analysis of pri-
cing and costs. First, if firms having substantial market shares in an
industry merge, this may suggest that the merger was designed to per-
mit monopoly pricing. In this way a discrete event-one which causes a
considerable and sudden shift in industry structure-may lead to mo-
nopoly pricing. Alternatively, government action may create monop-
oly pricing. The government, for example, within a short period of
time may have put various competing firms out of business and an-
nounced that no entry would be allowed. Monopoly pricing can be
expected to ensue.
The Supreme Court, in interpreting section 2, infers monopoly
power if a firm controls a substantial percentage of a "relevant mar-
ket." 3 The basic economic tool used in determining the "relevant mar-
ket" is the concept of cross-elasticity of demand. Competing products
where the cross-elasticity is high are treated as reasonably interchange-
able and thus part of the "relevant market."' 4  But cross-elasticity is a
10. POSNER, ANTrrRuST LAw, supra note 8, at 62-66.
11. Monopoly pricing is always carried out on the elastic portion of the monopolist's demand
curve since by definition its maximum total revenue lies along that portion of the curve. De-
mand conditions may cause similar pricing even under competition. But if there is also a sub-
stantial disparity between price and costs, then the inference that monopoly pricing is occurring
is strong.
12. In a natural monopoly situation, the service or goods can be provided more efficiently by
one firm than by many competing firms. Natural monopolies generally occur in highly capital-
intensive industries such as telephone communications or in production and distribution of elec-
tric power. See F. SCHERER, supra note 9, at 519-20; Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regu-
lation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548 (1969).
13. In United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966), the Court said:
The offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or
maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a conse-
quence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.
The percentage of the relevant market deemed to allow an inference of monopoly power is un-
settled. See generally Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc., 417 F.2d 203, 207 n.2 (5th Cir. 1969).
14. The leading case using the reasonable interchangeability test based on an analysis of
cross-elasticity of demand, i.e., the responsiveness of the sales of one product to the price changes
of the others, is United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
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function of the price chosen by the firm under suspicion of having mo-
nopoly power in a product market. t5 The higher the price chosen by
the alleged monopolist, the greater the cross-elasticity of demand with
respect to substitute products so that the "relevant market" will include
more products. Hence, the firm's percentage of the relevant market
will be lower.
Consider the landmark case of United States v. E.£ duPont de
Nemours and Co. 16  There duPont was charged with monopolizing
cellophane. The government argued that duPont had monopoly power
because it controlled almost seventy-five percent of the cellophane mar-
ket. The Supreme Court found that duPont did not have monopoly
power since it had less than twenty percent of the flexible packaging
market. The latter included waxed paper, glassine, vegetable parch-
ment, greaseproof, and pliofilm, all of which were deemed "reasonably
interchangeable" with cellophane. They may have been reasonably
interchangeable, however, precisely because duPont was engaging in
monopoly pricing of cellophane.
17
Thus duPont, if indeed monopolizing, may have been found not to
have monopoly power because it exercised its monopoly power by
charging a price that would increase the cross-elasticity of demand.
On the other hand, had it refrained from exercising this power by
charging a competitive price, it might then have been found to have
possessed monopoly power. This poses the paradox that the test of mo-
nopoly power used by courts suggests monopoly only if unexercised.
But unexercised monopoly power is irrational even in the absence of
15. Technically, cross-elasticity relates the percentage change in the quantity demanded
of one good (i.e., the one in which the charge of monopoly is involved) to the percentage change
in price of another good. It measures the sensitivity to the price of substitutes. As a monopolist
raises the price of his product, buyers become more interested n and more sensitive to price
changes in substitute products. See POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 8, at 128.
16. 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
17. The defect in the reasonable interchangeability test was recognized at the time it was
announced by Professor Turner in Turner, Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane Case, 70 HARv.
L. REv. 281 (1956). Professor Turner said:
As I have noted, the Court's "reasonable interchangeability" test in Cellophane for
defining the market with respect to distinct substitutes could mean either of two things,
First, it may mean that distinct substitutes showing a cross-elasticity of demand at prices
that have actually been charged are to be included in the market even though produced
at a substantial margin of disadvantage. Second, the test may incorporate a considera-
tion of costs, so that these substitutes will be excluded where the Government shows that
at prices producing a high cross-elasticity the alleged monopolist has a substantial cost
advantage.
The first version ...would be plainly wrong as a purported test of monopoly
power. . . .This version of the test would insulate many "true" monopolies from the
impact of the antitrust laws.
Id. at 308-09.
Unfortunately, at least in patent fraud cases if not generally, the first version of the test has
been adopted rather than the second and correct version. Had the latter been adopted, the mo-
nopoly power of a patent would be measured by the actual royalties charged by the patentee or
if the patentee refuses to license, then by the implicit royalty built into the patentee's price
structure.
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section 2. Nevertheless, section 2, as interpreted, penalizes unexer-
cised power at least if there is an intent to exercise it.1 s Patent fraud
cases demonstrate this paradox in pristine form.
II. PATENTS AND MONOPOLY POWER
Rights granted to a patentee are greater than those possessed by
an ordinary property owner. Conventionally, property is the result of
efforts by its current or previous owners, but others are free to create
and use similar property. But once a patent has been granted, even
independent development and use by others is prohibited. 9 Thus, it is
a true monopoly whose existence leads to a higher price charged for the
patented product, or for products made by a patented process, than
would be charged in its absence. So patents do indeed raise prices
and reduce output over what would occur under free competition. To
seek a patent is an attempt to acquire the right to engage in monopoly
pricing. Once this right is obtained, enforcing it or threatening to do
so is equivalent to either a continuation of the attempt or a protection
of actual monopoly pricing.
The seminal case of Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Ma-
chinery & Chemical Corp.20 arguably implied that a "relevant market"
analysis is necessary to establish a patent fraud monopolization claim.
Walker Process can best be understood after a brief review of the pro-
cess of obtaining a patent from the United States Patent Office. Cur-
rently, all proceedings except interferences are ex parte. The process
is initiated by filing for a patent and the application is then examined by
the Patent Office. This examination includes a search for the relevant
prior art. Although a large portion of the legal prior art exists in
printed form in the Patent Office, there is for each application only a lim-
ited amount of time to search for relevant prior art. It is possible that
an applicant may be aware of relevant prior art existing in the Patent
Office but not turned up by the Patent Office during its limited search.
More significantly, the applicant may be aware of relevant prior art that
is not available in any form in the Patent Office. Such was the situation
in Walker Process.
The case began as a conventional patent infringement case filed by
the owner of the patent, Food Machinery, against an alleged infringer,
Walker Process. Walker Process subsequently learned that the patent
was invalid because Food Machinery had sold a machine employing the
patented invention more than a year before the filing of the patent ap-
plication.21 Food Machinery moved to dismiss the suit and Walker
18. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
19. The United States patent laws do not provide any defense to a patent infringement
suit based on independent invention. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1970).
20. 382 U.S. 172 (1965). See note 4 supra.
21. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1970) reads in part: "A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . .
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Process filed a counterclaim under section 2 of the Sherman Act based
on fraud on the Patent Office. The district court's dismissal of both the
infringement suit and the counterclaim was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.22 Both courts concluded that no claim
of unlawful monopolization or attempt thereof could be based on fraud
on the Patent Office. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that such a
claim could be established. Because it was unclear, however, whether
the patented device comprised a relevant market and because substi-
tutes for the patented product may have existed, the Court refused to
find on the pleadings before it that fraud on the Patent Office was a per
se offense.
Thus, in Walker Process, since the invalidating event was the pub-
lic use more than a year before the filing of the patent application, the
Patent Office, even if it had conducted the most thorough search of its
documents, could not have become aware of the unpatentability of the
Food Machinery invention. Moreover, no potential infringer could go
to the Patent Office and discover it.23  Even though only one piece of
prior art was involved, which unquestionably invalidated the patent,
and the patentee knew that the patent would be invalid if the appro-
priate information ever came to light, the Supreme Court arguably im-
plied that for a section 2 violation more must be shown, that is, the pat-
ent had to be shown to cover a relevant product market.24
Consider why this additional requirement is wrong. First, the fact
that the patent was taken out by Food Machinery evidences an intent
by it to cause higher prices and lower output than would otherwise have
occurred. Otherwise Food Machinery would not have paid the costs of
obtaining patent protection in the Patent Office and of enforcing it in the
courts. Thus, the patent had value. Perhaps the patent did not permit
a high enough monopoly price to constitute monopolization since the
patented product may have competed with a suffictent number of substi-
tutes so that the patentee could not raise its price substantially above
the competitive level. Yet monopoly pricing is involved whenever a
patent has value. Once it is established that a patent has value, and
that it therefore conveys some monopoly power, there is no need to de-
termine the quantity of that power. The view that a relevant market
analysis is necessary in monopolization cases based on patent fraud is,
therefore, bereft of sound intellectual footing.25
(b) the invention was . . . in public use or on sale in this country more than one year prior to
the date of the application for patent in the United States ... "
22. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp. v. Walker Process Equip., Inc., 335 F.2d 315 (7th Cir,
1964), rev'd, 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
23. Other than the rarely used "public use proceedings" authorized by 37 C.F.R. § 1.292
(1976), knowledge of acts such as public uses or sales is not available to the Patent Office.
24. See note 4 supra.
25. In essence, the law has taken the wrong turn by defining cross-elasticity independent of
costs. See Turner, supra note 17, at 309 and POSNER, ANTITR sT LAW, supra note 8, at 128.
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A good illustration of this absurdity is found in Acme Precision
Products, Inc. v. American Alloys Corp.26 The case began in the con-
ventional way as a suit by Acme Precision Products, Inc. thereinafter
Acme], the owner of a patent covering an alloy known as Almag 35, and
Acme's exclusive licensee, William F. Jobbins, Inc. The defendant
American Alloys Corporation [hereinafter American] was charged
with infringement based on its product, Amalloy. In addition to the
usual defenses, American filed a section 2 counterclaim based on patent
fraud, asserting that Almag 35 was in public use more than a year
before the filing of the patent application covering it and that plaintiffs
were aware of this public use during the prosecution of the patent ap-
plication before the Patent Office.
The evidence introduced at trial showed that the plaintiffs had vig-
orously enforced the patent. All of the primary producers of aluminum
in the United States had been forced by notices of infringement and
threats of suit to take licenses under it and to pay a royalty of forty dol-
lars per ton on all patented alloys produced. Plaintiffs made every
possible effort to stifle unlicensed production of the patented alloy.
While no evidence was offered on this point, economic theory would
suggest that a royalty was built into the price of the patented alloy so
that purchasers were paying roughly forty dollars per ton more than
they would have in the absence of the patent.27  The lower court on
these facts had no difficulty finding that the patent defined the relevant
market even though for many applications substitute alloys, known in
the trade as 218 alloys, were available at a lower price.
The appeals court indicated that it was convinced that all of the
cheaper 218 alloys had to be included in the relevant market because of
the record of competitive interchangeability between them and the pat-
ented alloy. No evidence was available concerning what would have
happened in the market if the forty dollar per ton royalty had not been
part of the patented alloy's price structure.
The court then summed up as follows:
The argument that buyers would not pay the royalties for Almag 35
if it did not constitute a separate market is unconvincing. Use of a spe-
cific product turns on many variables determined by the individual pref-
erences of the specific buyer. Thus, as in duPont, buyers may prefer
cellophane because of its alleged superior qualities over some other
flexible wrapper and be willing to pay a higher price. Yet this does not
of itself place cellophane in a separate market. The "end use" of a
product has a greater influence on the determination of "cross-elasticity"
than the higher price of a more desirable product.
28
Once costs are examined the issue of monopoly is determined by the decision to compare or
refrain from comparing substitutes.
26. 347 F. Supp. 376 (W.D. Mo. 1972), rev'd, 484 F.2d 1237 (8th Cir. 1973).
27. See generally W. BOWMAN, PATEr AND ANTrrausT LAw 66-70 (1973).
28. 484 F.2d at 1244.
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The appeals court clearly overlooked the fact that the higher price
of the patented alloy was due at least in part to the unlawful monopoly
power exercised by the plaintiffs. Whether that was also the reason for
the higher price of cellophane was unanswered by the Supreme Court
and could not be answered using the "cross-elasticity" methodology.
III. ATTEMPTS AND ACTUAL MONOPOLIZATION COMPARED
The previous analysis of the relevant market paradox applies only
to completed monopolizations. Attempt cases, which require a show-
ing of intent to bring about a monopoly coupled with a dangerous prob-
ability of success,29 should be subjected to a different though related
analysis. This may be illustrated in the following manner. Assume
that a new product is being made under competitive conditions. A
proposed merger of all of the producers, if challenged as an attempt to
monopolize, should be judged using a relevant market determined by
the product's reasonable interchangeability at the premerger price.
If the claimed violation is actual monopolization through merger, then
the relevant market clearly should be determined using the premerger
rather than the postmerger price. Similarly, if a producer intends
through fraud to patent a new product that is currently being made un-
der competitive conditions, then competing products cannot be respon-
sible for the competitive price level since in the face of these substi-
tutes the producer seeking the patent intends to raise the price of the
product in order to make the act of obtaining the patent profitable. It
would seem that the mere seeking of a patent, with the intent to em-
ploy fraud in doing so, would supply both elements of intent to monop-
olize and dangerous probability of success. In any event, the compet-
itive price level is determined through competition among the
producers, the elimination of which will provide the patentee with
monopoly profits. If the patent were valueless, then substitutes would
hold down the price even if a patent were obtained and only in that
circumstance would the appropriate relevant market include such sub-
stitutes. In short, the pursuit of a valueless patent cannot lead to con-
trol of a substantial portion of a relevant market. But if the patent
has value, then the relevant market should be co-extensive with the
patent itself because the substitutes could not control the price at the
competitive level. Only if the relevant market is measured as if suc-
cess had already been achieved-i.e., prices had risen to a monopoly
level-would the attempt offense fail because, if successful, the patentee
would be found to be devoid of monopoly power.
Ironically, the foregoing analysis suggests that a relevant market
analysis is appropriate only for attempt to monopolize cases, and not for
29. See, e.g., American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); Swift and Co.
v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
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those of completed monopolization, yet the controversy in section 2 law
has centered on claims that it is section 2 attempt cases that can dis-
pense with a relevant market analysis. The District of Columbia
Circuit has explained this dispute as follows:
The disagreement over the significance of the Walker Process opin-
ion is part of a larger controversy over whether proof of market share
ought to be a necessary element of a claim of attempted monopolization
under Sherman § 2 .... The prevailing view is that a plaintiff must es-
tablish a "dangerous probability" of successful monopolization . . . and
therefore must define the relevant market and show that the defendant
exercises some control over it. . . The Ninth Circuit has taken a differ-
ent view-that although evidence of market share may be relevant, a "dan-
gerous probability of success" can be inferred from a specific intent to set
prices or exclude competition in a portion of the market without a legit-
imate business purpose. .... 30
The court went on to point out that the Ninth Circuit's view, while gen-
erally unacceptable, may have merit in patent fraud cases because pat-
ent fraud has no redeeming social value. Thus, it should be a per sevio-
lation. In essence, the court suggests that the law should be revised
only in patent cases because the Walker Process rule leads to the wrong
result. Perhaps for the reasons suggested earlier a more extensive
revision of section 2 law should be made.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is time that the courts recognize that patents are monopolies
and that obtaining them by wrongful means violates the statute against
monopolization. Currently, if the relevant market is measured after a
patent becomes valuable owing to a price increase, monopoly under the
usual test will not be found. Hence, the relevant market test is of lim-
ited usefulness. Relevant market analysis has value only in attempt
cases, where there is no issue of actual monopoly pricing. In these
cases, the relevant issue is whether there is a dangerous probability
of an artificially created rise in what otherwise would be the price level,
and an analysis of the relevant market may aid in the determination of
this issue. Relevant market analysis is rarely helpful, however, in
actual monopolization cases, in which the issue is whether prices are
currently maintained at an artificially high level. In patent monopo-
lization cases the existence of a patent wrongfully obtained should be
the only evidence needed on the question of the existence of monop-
oly power.
30. Oetiker v. Jurid Werke, G.m.b.H., 556 F.2d 1, 7-8 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (footnotes deleted).
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